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JURISDICTION 
This Court's jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Article VIII, 
Section 3, of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and Rules 3 
and 4, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. Plaintiff is appealing 
from the Third Judicial District Court's entry of Judgment in favor 
of Defendant on Defendant's affirmative defense of accord and 
satisfaction. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding an 
accord and satisfaction when all credible evidence and trial 
testimony supports such a determination. 
Whether Respondent is entitled to an award of costs and 
attorney's fees incurred in responding to this frivolous and 
unwarranted appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff, Kelly Howard (hereinafter referred to as 
"Plaintiff" or "Howard"), initiated the instant proceeding below 
as a personal injury action against Defendant, Robert E. Buhler 
(hereinafter referred to as "Defendant" or "Buhler"). On June 7 
and 8, 1988, this proceeding came on regularly for trial before the 
Honorable James S. Sawaya, Third District Court Judge, with the 
right to a jury having been waived by both parties. Both parties 
proceeded to put on evidence in their respective cases in chief. 
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The matter was fully presented, argued and submitted and the trial 
court's decision thereon taken under advisement. The trial court 
thereafter submitted its Memorandum Decision dated September 21, 
1988, finding in favor of Defendant. 
On October 14, 1988, the trial court entered its Order, 
Findings and Entry of Judgment in favor of Defendant on his 
affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction. A copy of said 
Order, Findings and Entry of Judgment is attached hereto as "A" to 
the addendum. The Findings of the trial court read in pertinent 
part as follows: 
1. . . . it was stipulated by counsel and 
agreed by the Court that the issue of accord 
and satisfaction would be considered by the 
Court, and if Defendant prevailed on the issue, 
that it would be dispositive of all other 
issues. 
2. The Court on the issue of the affirmative 
defense of accord and satisfaction, finds that 
on July 8, 1986, Christine Kirchoff, on behalf 
of Defendant's liability insurer offered 
Plaintiff the amount of $8,000.00 as settlement 
of all claims arising out of the automobile 
accident at issue herein. On or about this 
same date, Plaintiff accepted the settlement 
figure in the amount of $8,000.00. Therefore, 
the parties expressed a mutual assent or 
meeting of the minds with regard to the 
settlement figure and a binding accord and 
satisfaction had been achieved. 
Record of proceedings, at 289. (The Record will hereinafter be 
referred to as "R. at " ) . 
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On November 4, 1988, Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal from 
said Judgment. 
B. Statement of Facts and Evidence Supporting Trial Court's 
Judgment. 
On November 9, 1985, Plaintiff was involved in an automobile 
accident with Defendant, allegedly resulting in bodily injury to 
Plaintiff. Following the accident, Plaintiff communicated with Ms. 
Christine Kirchoff, a claims adjustor for Defendant's insurer, 
American Concept Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as 
"American Concept"). On January 24, 1986, Plaintiff and Ms. 
Kirchoff agreed by telephone to settle all of Plaintiff's claims 
arising out of the automobile accident for the sum of $2,834.00. 
Transcript of proceedings, testimony of Christine L. Kirchoff, at 
96-7. (Hereinafter referred to as "Tr. at " ) . 
Ms. Kirchoff was thereafter contacted by Plaintiff on May 20, 
1986, and was advised that Plaintiff was going to withhold 
executing the Release upon which they had previously agreed. Tr. 
at 97-98. 
On or about May 29, 1986, Plaintiff entered into a Fee 
Agreement with his present counsel, Robert Hansen, which provides 
that Hansen would receive, "50% of excess over insurance company's 
written offer to settle for a certain amount, which ever is lower 
. . . ." Defendant's Exhibit 44, a copy of which is attached 
702812.mtf 8 
hereto as "B" to the addendum, see also, Tr. at 58-60. Thus, 
Plaintiff was compelled under his unorthodox fee agreement with 
counsel to mislead Defendant's insurer into believing it was 
settling the case and providing him written settlement documents. 
This fee agreement then contemplated authorizing Plaintiff's 
counsel to proceed with a legal action against Defendant in breach 
of this agreement. Tr. at 59. 
On July 8, 1986, Plaintiff called Ms. Kirchoff and explained 
a computer programming course which he was interested in and which 
would provide him with a certificate of employability even though 
he had never graduated from high school. The cost of the course 
was $3,700.00, and in analyzing the case, Ms. Kirchoff at that 
point in time made Plaintiff an offer of settlement in the amount 
of $8,000.00. At that time Plaintiff agreed to settle his claims 
in full with Defendant for $8,000.00, as a novation of the earlier 
settlement agreement. Tr. at 99-100, 101-105. Ms. Kirchoff did 
condition this settlement upon receipt of Plaintiff's educational 
contract to justify the increased settlement figure. Plaintiff 
performed this condition by sending a copy of his contract to Ms. 
Kirchoff. Tr. at 102. Defendant's Exhibit 17, a copy of which is 
attached hereto as "C" to the addendum. 
On August 6, 1986, Ms. Kirchoff dispatched a letter to 
Plaintiff requesting that he comply with the t€>rms of their 
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settlement agreement. The letter stated as follows: 
On July 8, 1986, we made a settlement with you 
for injuries sustained in the above-captioned 
incident contingent upon our receiving a copy 
of the school contract for your computer 
training. 
Defendant's Exhibit 12, a copy of which is attached hereto as "D" 
to the addendum. 
On or about August 8, 1986, Plaintiff sent a letter with the 
education contract to Ms. Kirchoff stating: 
Enclosed is the contract from the school which 
I am attending (Mountainwest College). 
Please send me my release form for $8,000.00 
on which we agreed. 
Defendant's Exhibit 14, a copy of which is attached hereto as "E" 
to the addendum. 
Ms. Kirchoff sent the Release from as requested, accompanied 
by a memo dated August 8, 1986, in which she stated: "Please sign 
and have notarized the enclosed Release so that we may conclude 
your claim." Defendant's Exhibits 13 and 16 respectively, attached 
hereto as "F" and "G" to the addendum. 
Ms. Kirchoff received no reply from Plaintiff until October 
13, 1986, when she received a copy of the Complaint initiating the 
action below. 
Plaintiff wholly misstates Ms. Kirchoff's testimony at trial 
with respect to the $8,000.00 settlement. Plaintiff claims Ms. 
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Kirchoff did not testify that he accepted the $8,000.00 offer, but 
only that he was "ready" to settle. However, as a review of the 
transcript indicates, Plaintiff had agreed with Ms. Kirchoff 
respecting a settlement agreement in complete satisfaction of his 
claims. Ms. Kirchofffs testimony at trial is as follows: 
Q. Did there come a time when you had an 
opportunity, you received another telephone 
call from Kelly Howard concerning this mcitter 
prior to—excuse me, we talked about a letter 
or conversation of July 8? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why don?t you tell the court who initiated the 
call and what was discussed during the 
conversation? 
A. On July 8 Kelly would have had to initiate* the 
call to me since he didn't have a phone. Kelly 
indicated at that point in time he felt he was 
ready to settle the claim. I said "are you 
sure? I do not wish to pressure you." He 
said, "I am ready." 
Q. Based upon the totality of the events which led 
up to the filing of this lawsuit, what, if any, 
understanding did you have and do you have 
today as to whether or not his claim had been 
concluded by both parties? 
A. I believe it was concluded. 1 offered, he 
accepted. 
Q. But were there any [reservations] on his 
acceptance such as "but I want to review it 
with an attorney"? 
A. In August of 1986, no. I had no knowledge 
there was an attorney until October 9. 
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Tr. at 101, 105. 
During the trial, Phyllis Buhler, Mr. Buhler's wife, testified 
that during the traffic citation hearing held on or about January 
23, 1986, Plaintiff was asked if he had been fully compensated for 
his claims arising out of this automobile accident by Buhler's 
insurer. According to Mrs. Buhler, Plaintiff indicated that he 
had settled the case with Buhler's insurance company. Tr. at 90-
91. 
In the deposition taken of Plaintiff on October 22, 1987, the 
following hypothetical question was asked of Plaintiff as well as 
his accompanying response: 
Q. Okay. Let me ask you sort of a hypothetical 
question. If you called her [Kirchoff] up and 
you said, I want to settle this case for 
$8,000, and you discussed your school contract 
and she said okay, send me the school contract 
and I' 11 send you a release and we can conclude 
your claim and you never said anything more to 
her, do you think it's reasonable for her to 
believe that you had settled the claim? 
MR. HANSEN: I am going to object to that as calling for 
a conclusion in the form that it's posed, a legal 
conclusion. 
Q. (By Mr. Florence) Can you answer? 
MR. HANSEN: Go ahead and answer. 
THE WITNESS: I would imagine so, yes. 
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(Howard depo. tr. at 69-70). Thus, by Plaintiff's own admission, 
a reasonable person would have properly believed that Plaintiff had 
settled his claim. 
Nothing in any of the correspondence dispatched to Ms. 
Kirchoff by Plaintiff indicates that Plaintiff was not willing to 
settle his claims with Ms. Kirchoff on July 8, 1986. In fact, 
Plaintiff's testimony at trial was as follows: 
Q. You never told Ms. Kirchoff you did not intend 
to settle this case, did you? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Nor did you communicate to her that it was not 
your intention to conclude the . . . matter? 
A. That was not my intention. 
Q. Yes, you never disclosed that to her, did you? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Tr. at 50-51. 
Plaintiff knew that Ms. Kirchoff was attempting to settle this 
matter with him. Tr. at 47-48, 68. Yet, Plaintiff never 
"corrected" Ms. Kirchofffs perception of the situation and, in 
fact, at trial he equivocated as to whether or not he had actually 
settled, stating that he "might have settled for $8,000.00." Tr. 
at 68. 
When judged by the standard of objective reasonableness, all 
conduct of Plaintiff indicated that he had settled this case with 
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Ms. Kirchoff. After the fact, he has asserted that it was not his 
intent at the time to settle the claim, but that intent was never 
communicated to Ms. Kirchoff. Thus, under the circumstances, a 
reasonable person would have understood that Plaintiff had settled 
his claim. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The instant appeal is simply unfounded since all credible 
evidence set forth above supports the trial court's finding. In 
view of the deference to be accorded the trial court in reviewing 
the evidence and assessing the credibility of the witnesses, 
Plaintiff has failed to set forth even a single legally cognizable 
error of the lower court. In an attempt to avoid the judgment 
below, Plaintiff now claims that he had some unexpressed ulterior 
motives in securing a settlement agreement with Defendant's 
insurance carrier. However, these unexpressed and improper motives 
are insufficient to avoid a binding accord and satisfaction. Under 
the objective test applied under Utah law, a reasonable person 
would have believed that Plaintiff had settled his claim. 
2. The meritless questions raised in the instant appeal do 
not involve novel questions of first impression which would warrant 
the establishment of a new burden of proof to prove accord and 
satisfaction. The degree of proof required to establish an accord 
and satisfaction must be the same as that required to establish the 
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existence of any contract; i.e., a preponderance of the evidence. 
Where, as here, there is sufficient credible evidence to support 
such a finding, the trial court must be upheld. Further, even if 
a higher standard of proof were required, such a standard would be 
easily satisfied by the facts in the instant case. 
3. Defendant is entitled to an award of costs and attorney's 
fees incurred in responding to this frivolous appeal. Plaintiff 
has not identified any alleged error on the part of the trial 
court, but simply wants this Court to retry the facts of the case. 
A reasonable inquiry into applicable law and the record below 
demonstrates the patent impropriety of the instant appeal. 
ARGUMENT I 
THIS APPEAL HAS NOT BEEN FILED IN GOOD FAITH SINCE 
ALL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 
Plaintiff improvidently argues that there is insufficient 
evidence to support the trial court's finding of accord and 
satisfaction. This contention is absolutely contrary to the 
evidence established below. From a review of nothing more than the 
Statement of Facts above, the propriety of the trial court's 
judgment should be readily apparent. However, after setting forth 
the appropriate standard of review, Defendant will illustrate how 
the trial court's judgment is in accord with controlling Utah law 
as applied to the evidence in this case. 
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a. Standard of Review of Lower Court's Decision 
Plaintiff is asking this Court to retry the facts of this case 
rather than review the legal sufficiency of the trial courtf s 
findings. The issue on appeal is not whether there was a binding 
accord and satisfaction, but whether there was sufficient evidence 
for the trial judge to so find. 
The trial court's finding of accord and satisfaction must be 
upheld since sufficient credible evidence exists to sustain such 
a finding. In Christensen v. Abbott, 595 P. 2d 900 (Utah 1979), 
the Court upheld the trial court? s finding of accord and 
satisfaction where there was sufficient credible evidence to 
support that determination. .Id. at 902. The Court declared: 
After a careful review of the record, we 
cannot say, in deference to the trial court's 
prerogative to adjudge the credibility of 
witnesses, that the court's findings are not 
supported by credible evidence as to the 
parties' intentions regarding the cancel-
lation of the note. 
Id. 
Further, this Court is to review the evidence below in the 
light most favorable to the trial court's findings. Where there 
is sufficient credible evidence to support that finding, this Court 
must sustain them. Search v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 649 P.2d 
48 (Utah 1982). Search sets forth the deference to be accorded 
the trial judge's findings of fact in a non-jury trial: 
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As we have frequently stated, in a non-
jury trial it is the trial judge's pre-
rogative to find facts - including judging 
the credibility of witnesses, weighing the 
reliability of other evidence, and drawing 
fairly derived and reasonable inferences 
therefrom. On Appeal this Court reviews the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the 
trial court findings. Where there is 
competent evidence to support the findings 
this Court must sustain them. 
Id. at 50 (citations omitted). 
It is clear from the foregoing Statement of Facts that the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence supports the trial courtf s 
findings and judgment. Therefore, Plaintiff has not met his burden 
of overcoming the presumption of validity afforded the lower 
court's decision. "It is incumbent upon the appellant to marshall 
all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and 
to then demonstrate that even when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the factual determinations made by the court, that the 
evidence is insufficient to support its findings." Harline v. 
Campbell, 728 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1986) (footnote omitted). 
Under the standard of review employed by this Court, Plaintiff 
has failed to set forth even sufficient factual contentions to 
justify this appeal. Plaintiff has further failed to identify any 
cognizable error upon which this appeal may be based, since there 
is abundant evidence to support the trial court's finding and no 
suggestion that the trial court abused its discretion. 
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b. The Trial Court's Judgment Comports 
With Utah Law Respecting Accord and Satisfaction 
An accord and satisfaction arises when the parties to an 
agreement or cause of action agree that a different performance, 
to be made in substitution of the performance originally claimed 
by the Plaintiff, will discharge the obligations stated under the 
original agreement or cause of action. Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. 
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980). As the Court set out 
in Sugarhouse Finance there are four necessary elements to an 
accord and satisfaction: 
1. A proper subject matter; 
2. Competent parties; 
3. An assent or meeting of the minds of the 
parties; and 
4. A consideration given for the accord. 
Id. 
It is well recognized in Utah that the agreement to settle a 
disputed or uncertain cause of action constitutes valid 
consideration for the accord and satisfaction. "Where the 
underlying claim is disputed or uncertain ('unliquidated'), the 
obligorfs assent to the definite statement of performance in the 
accord amounts to sufficient consideration, as it constitutes a 
surrender of the right to dispute the initial obligation." Id. 
(footnote omitted). 
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The settlement of Plaintiff's bodily injury claim was a proper 
subject matter for a contract of accord and satisfaction. It is 
common for persons injured in automobile accidents to make monetary 
settlements with claims adjusters negotiating on behalf of their 
insureds. In the instant case, Plaintiff and Ms. Kirchoff 
negotiated and settled Plaintiff's claim as a matter of course. 
Plaintiff and Ms. Kirchoff are both competent parties and were 
so at the time of entering the settlement contract. 
Both parties agreed to the essential terms of the contract, 
i.e., that Plaintiff would release all claims in exchange for 
$8,000.00, provided he substantiate this increased amount by 
sending his educational contract. Plaintiff signed a letter 
stating those terms and indicating that he "agreed" to the terms. 
Ms. Kirchoff testified that she understood that a settlement had 
likewise been reached with Plaintiff. 
The standard used to determine whether a party to an accord 
and satisfaction contract mutually assented to its terms is judged 
by an objective standard of what a "reasonable" person would have 
understood from the party's language or acts. The Utah case law 
on this subject is clear. In Jaramillo v. Farmer's Insurance 
Group, 669 P. 2d 1231 (Utah 1983), the Court was called upon to 
consider the effect of a settlement agreement reached in compromise 
of a personal injury action against State Farm Insurance Company's 
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insured. In finding the settlement agreement to be binding upon 
the Plaintiff, the Court declared: 
In light of the stipulation of the parties, it 
is clear that Plaintiff outwardly accepted 
State Farm's terms of settlement. Any contrary 
intentions he may have had were left 
unexpressed and were not otherwise disclosed. 
It is well established in the law that 
unexpressed intentions do not effect the 
validity of a contract. 
Id. at 1233. 
In reaching the conclusions set forth above, the Court relied 
upon the earlier decision, Allen v. Bissinger & Co., 62 Utah 226, 
219 P. 539 (1923), for the following proposition: 
The apparent mutual assent of the parties, 
essential to the formation of a contract, must 
be gathered by the language employed by them, 
and the law imputes to a person an intention 
corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his 
words and acts. It judges of his intentions 
by his outward expressions and excludes all 
questions in regard to his unexpressed 
intention. If his words or acts judged by a 
reasonable standard manifest an intention to 
agree to the matter in question, that agreement 
is established and it is immaterial what may 
be the real but unexpressed state of his mind 
upon the subject. 
Jaramillo, 669 P.2d at 1233. 
When judged under a reasonable standard, the outward 
expressions of Plaintiff as set forth in detail above, rather than 
any unspoken intentions he now claims to have had, establishes a 
binding accord and satisfaction. During the telephone conversation 
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on July 8, 1986, Plaintiff and Ms. Kirchoff agreed to settle 
Plaintifffs bodily injury claim for $8,000.00. As execution of the 
settlement agreement, Plaintiff sent his education contract as well 
as a signed letter to Ms. Kirchoff which stated in part, "please 
send me my release form for $8,000.00 on which we agreed." 
Therefore, based upon the objective standard, reasonable minds 
would have understood that the parties had settled this dispute. 
Plaintiff cites no authority in support of his proposition 
that the parties had not entered an accord and satisfaction. 
Instead, Plaintiff attempts to distinguish the authorities cited 
by Defendant. Plaintiff's attempts to distinguish Sugar House 
Finance Co., 610 P. 2d 1369 (Utah 1980) are ineffectual since 
Defendant cited the Sugar House Finance case to set forth the four 
necessary elements of an accord and satisfaction. Plaintiff 
likewise attempts to distinguish Jaramillo v. Farmers Insurance 
Group, 669 P. 2d 1231 (Utah 1983), and Allen v. Bissinger & Co., 219 
P. 539 (1923). However, those cases are cited by Defendant to 
establish the proper standard under contract law for evaluating 
whether the parties expressed the requisite mutual assent or 
"meeting of the minds." In that regard, Plaintiff admits that an 
objective standard is to be used in analyzing the issue of mutual 
assent and quotes the Allen decision as follows: "There is no 
substantial conflict in the evidence, the most important part of 
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which consists of written communications between the parties." 
Plaintiff relies on this one sentence to claim that here all 
critical communications were oral rather than in writing. However, 
a review of the above facts indicates that by Plaintiff's own 
letter received August 8, 1986, he had memorialized the substance 
of the settlement agreement reached with Ms. Kirchoff on July 8, 
1986. 
Therefore, the Allen case (and as more recently cited with 
approval in the Jaramillo case) provides clear precedent for 
finding a binding contract of accord and satisfaction here. 
i.) An Executed Release of all Claims is not Necessary 
to a Finding of Accord and Satisfaction. 
An accord and satisfaction need not be in writing. Golden 
Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985); 
Christensen v. Abbott, 595 P. 2d 900, 902 (Utah 1979). An appellate 
court will sustain the trial court's finding of accord and 
satisfaction if there is sufficient credible evidence respecting 
accord and satisfaction. Christensen 595 at 902. See also, Cheney 
v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86 (Utah 1963). 
In Lawrence Construction Co. v. Holmquist, 642 P.2d 382 (Utah 
1982) a general contractor filed suit to foreclose a mechanic's 
lien on a ski lodge construction project and the defendant 
subcontractor sought to enforce a previous settlement agreement 
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entered into with the general contractor respecting settlement of 
certain claims arising out of the construction project. The trial 
court found that a valid accord and satisfaction had been entered 
between the general and subcontractors. The general contractor 
appealed and the trial courtf s decision was upheld by the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
In upholding the earlier decision, the Court declared: 
The stipulation and letter sent to National 
Mechanical by their terms indicate they were 
merely to memorialize a previous oral agreement 
made between the parties. That the parties 
contemplated subsequent execution of a written 
instrument as evidence of their agreement did 
not prevent the oral agreement from binding the 
parties. ... If a written agreement is 
intended to memorialize an oral contract, a 
subsequent failure to execute the written 
document does not nullify the oral contract. 
In our view the prior agreement was an 
executory accord and as such constitutes a 
valid enforceable contract. fAn accord is an 
agreement between parties, one to give up or 
perform, the other to receive or accept, such 
agreed payment or performance in satisfaction 
of a claim. f Browning v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Society, 94 Utah 532, 72 P.2d 1060 
(1937). In Alaska Creamery Products, Inc. v. 
Wells, Alaska 373 P.2d 505, 511 (1962), the 
court defined an executory accord as f an 
agreement that an existing claim shall be 
discharged in the future by the rendition of 
a substituted performance.f See also, 6 
Corbin, Contracts, §1269 at 75-76 (1962)." 
Id. at 384 (citations omitted). 
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Therefore, as in the Lawrence decision, the receipt of the 
signed Release of All Claims for $8,000 was not necessary prior to 
finding a binding oral accord and satisfaction entered into by 
Plaintiff and Ms. Kirchoff on July 8, 1986, As in Lawrence, the 
record here supports the conclusion that an enforceable accord and 
satisfaction was reached by the parties. Further, the accord and 
satisfaction was in no way conditioned upon receipt of the executed 
settlement agreement and therefore, Plaintiff's continued claims 
regarding the release are both misplaced and irrelevant. 
ARGUMENT II 
THIS APPEAL DOES NOT PRESENT ANY NOVEL QUESTIONS 
OF FIRST IMPRESSION WHICH WOULD WARRANT THIS 
COURT ESTABLISHING A NEW EVIDENTIARY STANDARD 
TO PROVE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 
Despite Plaintiff's rather desperate claims to the contrary, 
this is not an unusual case of first impression. Lawrence 
Construction, 642 P. 2d 382 (Utah 1982), clearly establishes the 
propriety and enforceability of an oral accord and satisfaction. 
Id. at 384. Further, when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the factual determinations made by the lower court, all evidence 
in this case supports that court' s findings. Therefore, this Court 
must uphold the trial court?s judgment. Harline v. Campbell, 728 
P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1986). 
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This case certainly does not justify the announcement of a new 
legal standard requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence to 
establish an accord and satisfaction. Rather, this Court is to 
uphold the trial court's finding where there is sufficient credible 
evidence to support that determination, Christensen v. Abbott, 595 
P.2d at 902. After a review of the above facts, and in deference 
to the trial court's prerogative to adjudge the credibility of the 
witnesses, it is contrary to reason for Plaintiff to claim that the 
court's findings are not supported by credible evidence. 
Additionally, Plaintiff argues that policy considerations 
require a heightened degree of proof to establish an accord and 
satisfaction. However, the true public policy consideration at 
issue here involves Plaintiff's unorthodox fee agreement witn 
counsel. That agreement required Plaintiff to actively mislead 
Defendant's insurance carrier into believing that it was 
negotiating a good faith settlement of Plaintiff's personal injury 
action. That level of deception in negotiating a settlement 
agreement as well as the subsequent breach of that agreement should 
be strongly discouraged. "The law favors the resolution of 
controversies and uncertainties through compromise and settlement 
rather than through litigation . . . . " 15 Am.Jur. 2d Compromise 
and Settlement §5 (1976). Therefore, if any consideration of 
public policy is implicated here, it requires affirmance of the 
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lower court's judgment since it encourages sincere and honest 
negotiated settlements. 
Plaintiff cites Brown v. Brown, 744 P. 2d 333 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987), in support of his claim for a more demanding burden of 
proof. However, Brown has no application to a controversy 
involving accord and satisfaction. Brown involves a situation 
where the Plaintiff remains silent during a purported settlement 
conference with the defendant and counsel for both parties. The 
issue in Brown essentially involved whether counsel could enter a 
binding agreement for the plaintiff with plaintiff manifesting no 
assent to the terms thereof. Here, however, Plaintiff initiated 
all relevant contact with Ms. Kirchoff, agreed by telephone on July 
8, 1986, to settle his claims and memorialized his intention to 
settle through the letter received by Ms. Kirchoff on August 8, 
1986. Thus, Plaintiff's reliance upon the Brown decision is 
unfounded. 
Further, Plaintiff grossly mischaracterizes Holder v. Holder, 
9 Utah 2d 163, 340 P. 2d 761 (1959). That case did not, as 
Plaintiff claims, increase "the required proof from clear and 
convincing to proof beyond a reasonable doubt in an annulment 
suit." Holder simply coalesces the previously established majority 
position "that the presumption of legitimacy will prevail unless 
the contrary is proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 763. 
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(footnote omitted). This case, therefore, in no way supports 
Plaintiff's claim for an increased burden of proof here. 
Thus, it is readily apparent that this case does not require 
a change of the legal evidentiary standards necessary to establish 
a binding contract or, more particularly, an accord and 
satisfaction. Moreover, even if a higher evidentiary standard was 
required, it is certain that, when viewed in the most favorable 
light, all evidence adduced below supports the lower court's 
findings and judgment. 
ARGUMENT III 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF HIS REASONABLE 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN RESPONDING 
TO THE INSTANT APPEAL 
As the foregoing arguments plainly illustrate, the instant 
appeal is not based on any legally supportable grounds. Plaintiff 
has filed this frivolous proceeding simply as a means of 
interposing delay and in an attempt to compel a more advantageous 
settlement from Defendant in order to avoid the unnecessary and 
additional expenses incurred in responding to this appeal. 
Reasonable inquiry into the facts of record and existing legal 
authority would have clearly indicated the impropriety of the 
instant appeal. 
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Therefore, Defendant respectfully seeks damages and single or 
double costs, including reasonable attorney's fees from Plaintiff, 
pursuant to Rules 33 and 40, R. Utah Ct. App. 
CONCLUSION 
The overwhelming weight of the evidence presented to the trial 
court supports the finding of accord and satisfaction. The issues 
raised by Plaintiff in no way frame a proper challenge to the trial 
court's judgment. Plaintiff has not raised any supportable claim 
of error below, but rather seeks to have this Court re-evaluate the 
evidence and reach a different conclusion. Therefore, the judgment 
of the lower court must be upheld in its entirety and the instant 
appeal dismissed with damages, attorney's fees and costs awarded 
to Defendant. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ffiy^feay of August, 1989. 
Donald J. Turser ' 
M. Taylor Florence 
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT, P.C. 
39 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE p/vj 
I hereby certify that on the tj^^^flay of August, 1989, I 
caused four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT to be served upon the following by depositing copies 
thereof in the United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed as 
follows: 
Robert B. Hansen 
838-18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
M. Taylor norence 
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Donald J. Purser, 2663 ^l,YTTl^fK?' 
M. Taylor Florence, 4835 ^ 
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT 
A Professional Corporation 
39 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-3555 
Attorneys for Defendant Buhler 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KELLY HOWARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT E. BUHLER, 
Defendant. 
ORDER, FINDINGS AND 
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C86-7662 
(Judge James S. Sawaya) 
On June 7, 1988, the above-referenced parties regularly 
appeared before the Court at the trial of this matter. Robert 
B. Hansen, Esq. appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff, and Donald 
J. Purser, Esq. and M. Taylor Florence, Esq. of Purser, Okazaki & 
Berrett, P.C. appeared on behalf of the Defendant. Both parties 
proceeded to put on evidence in their respective cases in chief. 
The matter was fully presented, argued and submitted, and the 
courts decision thereon taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the evidence and arguments of 
counsel, as well as the written memorandum submitted and all 
other documents of record in this case, thereafter submitted its 
memorandum decision dated September 21, 1988, finding in favor of 
Defendant on his affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction. 
In support of said decision, the following findings of fact are 
submitted: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This is a personal injury case resulting from an 
automobile collision on November 9, 1985. The issues of 
liability, causation and damages were presented during the trial 
of this matter, as well as Defendant's affirmative defense of 
accord and satisfaction. It was stipulated by counsel and agreed 
by the Court that the issue of accord and satisfaction would be 
considered by the court, and if Defendant prevailed on the issue, 
that it would be dispositive of all other issues. 
2. The Court, on the issue of the affirmative defense of 
accord and satisfaction, finds that on July 8, 1986, Christine 
Kirchoff, on behalf of Defendant's liability insurer offered 
Plaintiff the amount of $8,000.00 as settlement of all claims 
arising out of the automobile accident at issue herein. On or 
about this same date, Plaintiff accepted the settlement figure in 
the amount of $8,000.00. Therefore, the parties expressed a 
mutual assent or meeting of the minds with regard to this 
settlement figure and a binding accord and satisfaction had been 
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achieved• 
3. The Court further finds that the settlement of the 
claims arising out of the automobile accident herein is the 
proper subject matter for an accord and satisfaction and that the 
parties thereto were competent to enter into such an agreement. 
Finally, the Court finds that there was valid consideration in 
the agreement to settle a disputed, uncertain cause of action 
sufficient to create a binding accord and satisfaction. 
4. The finding of a valid accord and satisfaction is 
dispositive of this case and the Court, therefore, need not reach 
the issues of liability, causation and/or damages with respect to 
the personal injury claims herein. 
5. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that judgment be 
entered against Defendant, Robert E. Buhler, for the amount of 
$8,000.00. 
6. On file with the court and dated January 15, 1988, is a 
Notice of Offer of Judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure in the amount of $16,000. In as much as the 
judgment finally obtained by Plaintiff in this case was 
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significantly less than the $16,000 heretofore offered, costs 
shall be taxed to the Plaintiff. 
DATED t h i s M_ day of d2JZ<£*> 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
cisfk Ju4ge James S. Sawaya 
/ ~ \ „—^ / D i s t r i c t - C o u r t Judge 
/ ^Deputy Clerk 
Submitt 
Donald J . iajjfeer, Esq. 
M. Taylor Florence, Esq. 
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT, P.C. 
39 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CLIENT: NEAREST RELATIVE: (for use in maintaining contac 
\<&uUJ \4c^J^^J> K/AV U* ^Q x^ARQ 
This letter will set forth our agreement made on A ^ A V 3* ^  / v o *» concern 
your representation by Robert B. Hansen in yourclaim against (t*Qft€¥*T f^ 5 ^ ^ c 
which arose out of f ^ C^tx^ G L ^ ^ < ^ 6 C ^ ^ 
on M M A 7 J4flf> at ^ | o n gfl ^  flEb I A / B S Q / £ O * ^ > 
You have hired me to represent you in the claim described above. I will attempt to 
get a recovery by negotiating a settlement or by taking whatever legal action is deemed 
necessary. I cannot promise that we will be successful or that you will receive any mone 
If we are not successful, you will owe me nothing except expenses I have advanced. If we 
are successful, you will payjne one-third (33 1/3 %) pf\any recovery received^FCAsc o« 
I will advance all court costs necessary to pursue your claim, but you will have to 
repay me for those expenses even if we lose and no recovery is received. If a recovery i 
received, the expenses will be taken out of that recovery in addition to my fees. 
You authorize me to: (1) receive the proceeds of any recovery; (2) retain my 
percentage of the gross recovery; (3) deduct from the proceeds any expenses advanced 
by me; (4) deliver the balance to you; (5) execute all documents necessary to settle 
or close the case; and (6) settle any liens out of any recovery. 
As long as you are available for consultation, I will not settle your claim without 
first consulting with you and getting your approval. However, if you move or leave town, 
you agree to leave a phone number or address where you can be reached. You authorize me 
to settle your case on your behalf at whatever amount I deem advisable if I cannot locate 
you for a period of thirty (30) days. 
If you settle this claim without my consent, you will still have to pay me the same 
percentage of the final recovery as described above. 
I may terminate this agreement by giving 30 days written notice. If I terminate 
this agreement, I will not be entitled to my percentage; but you will still have to pay 
me for any expenses which I have advanced. If you terminate this agreement for any 
reason other than my misconduct or inability to act, I shall be entitled to my full fee 
as described above. You must also repay any expenses which I have advanced for your 
case within 20 days after any termination. 
It is agreed that I might bring in other }axtfers\iho will assist on your case. In 
that case, I will pay those lawyers out of my/fee. Thfere will be no cost to you. 
Date: ^ W ^ "7. l4& / \^ZZJh ^^Uy^-
0 ROBERT B. HANSEN 
I accept the fee arrangement set forth in this letter. EXHIBIT • 
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(801) 486-0621 
UA: H U M 
ACCT. NO 3038 
RETAIL INSTALLMENT CONTRACT/STUDENT ENROLLMENT AGREEMENT 
This contract and all attached sheets are one agreement and all the information, clauses and convenants in this contract are mcoroorated m 
the attached sheets as though set out in full therein, however, if any clause disclosure or covenant m this contract shall differ or be in conflict 
" with any and all attached sheet or sheets, this contract and its covenants shall govern. 
The undersigned school, college or university, hereinafter known as Seller, hereby sells and the undersigned student hereinafter known as 
Buvax, or yom hereby purchases, subject to the terms and conditions herein set out. the following coursets) and materials 
Buyer's Name({Nlr) 
starting 
(WTS) (TOS) OMlSS) [At? 
(Please Pnnti K eu> 
.course(s) as described in tne schools catalog 
e* • ^ c ut o 0 C 
, 1 9 . to be given at the following location. *Ztr\ LMC/'incw'D JL.«\'JVT 
. . You understand that you shall attend the Morn , , Afternoon. . E v e . 
Area Pnone ^ - *~7H t j 
session far ' * consecutive weeks/monthsiTotal number of hour* / / * - L > Total number of Semester/Quarter Units 
. D a y . 
AN N U A L n f e ^ ^ ^ 4 ? 
PERCENTAGE RATEi-^Jf 
pTheTJoet*$f your credit as 
yeatlyTate / ~ >;_ 
FINANCE CHARGER. -
The dollar amount the credit 
will cost your**"?";^ * 
^ AMOUNT FINANCED 
„ The amount of credit^ 
provided to you on your" 
behalf. 
TOTAL OF PAYMENTS 
TheVmount you will have 
paid after you have made 
all payments as scheduled. 
, /'/OZ.CV 
TOTAL SALES PRICE 
The total cost of your purchase 
on credit including your down 
payment and/or registration lee 
ofS 
S _ 3 , A - C if" 
YOUR PAYMENT SCHEDULE WILL BE L» b( ( rv r > ^ £ *** ^ f < ' ^ b r 6 ° " / * INCUJC£' > * *U/ft ~" ~r Kl Uut'f^ 
Number of payments Amount of each payment 
V'/7n 
When payments are due 
_t - _ y ' 
Monthly Beginning. . 19 <? W and on the same day of each month 
weekly—z: thereafter until paid in full ,~~ zz. 
II Buy«f thouia n««d addition*) training *na/or txtend f^lutming tn« BUVM «•>»! h* er^ ry« •< «r>» f t * at i ~ * . . A, par mmr/.««»fcjiww»th ^ > ,<//_ 
THE POLICY OF THE SCHOOL IS: alfcuition and fees are due 
and payable on first day of attendance. * 
IT Payments will be made at the office of the Seller or Seller's 
assignee. - . , 
27 In -event of default of Buyer in the payment of any installment if 
such default shall continue for a period of 10 days, Seller may 
collect a delinquency charge not exceeding 5% of such install' 
ment or $5 00. whichever is less minimum SI 00 provided that 
such delinquency charge may be collected not more than once 
on any installment 
3. If Buyer defaults in the performance of his/her obligation here-
under, including the making of any payment provided for herein 
when due and payable, the Seller, at his/her option and without 
notice to Buyer, may declare the whole amount unpaid hereunder 
immediately due and oavable 
4 In the event that the holder of this contract prevails in any action 
to enforce the terms or provisions hereof, Buyer agrees to pay 
reasonable attorney fees and actual court costs Buyer warrants 
that all of the statements made in the Buyer's statement are true 
and correct 
5. Buyer is entitled to pay in advance the remaining unpaid bal* 
ance due hereunder and receive a pro rate refund of the FIN-
ANCE CHARGE computed in accordance with the actuarial 
This contract embodies the who68«Heement between these parties, 
and the Buyer agrees that no representation, warranty or guaranty 
has been made to him/her which is not expressly set forth herein, and 
that all the benefits hereof accruing to the Seller, shall also accrue to 
Seller's assignee or any subsequent assignee No transfer, renewal, ~ 
extension or assignment of this contract shall release Buyer from 
his/her obligation hereunder 
Time is of the essence of this contract, and all terms and designations herein contained shall be deemed to have the numper, gender and entitiy 
applicable to parties who execute this contract The term Seller shall be deemed to include any assignee or subseouent holder of this contract 
If any part or provision hereof is contrary to the provisions of law in any state wherein this contract may be executed, the remaining provisions 
shall be binding and effective nevertheless. . 
NOTICE TO BUYER* (1) Do not sign this agreement before you read It or If It contains any blank spaces to be filled in. (2) You are 
entitled to a completely filled-ln copy of this agreement (3) You can repay the full amount due underthis agreement at anyt ime and 
obtain a partial refund of the finance charge if It is S1 or more Because of the way the amount of this refund will be figured, the time 
when you prepay could Increase the ultimate cost of credit underthis agreement. (4) If you desire to pay off in advance the full amount 
due, the amount of the refund you are entitle to, If any, will be furnished upon request. (5) This agreement is not binding until 
accepted by Seller. — . — _ - _ -
" ITEMIZATION OF THE AMOUNT FINANCED 
1. CASH PRICE * ' - , / as* "" 
a.Tuition.: .'. , - , «. O.bOO 
* b. Registration Fee s /DC 
c. Incidental Fee* a A/fcA* £ 
d. Supplies.: T *.' *jj*rft'flirf^ 
e. Books *J~r«n*'Cr'' 
f % Sales Tax s / 11 £~ 
2. TOTAL CASH PRICE £ ^ ~* CL 
3. LESS DEDUCTIONS
 C>J 
a,Registration Fee s " ' , _ 
dOther S
 J J„ ^ ~UZ} 
4. TOTAL DEDUCTIONS S L s l l l L ^ L j 
5. UNPAID BALANCE OF CASH PRICE ^ / > , . . o- v 
(2 less4) & s VOjJ 
6. AMOUNT FINANCED $ Q be Uc~~ 
. The entire amount financed will be applied to your accounts. 
I hereby guarantee payment o( all obligations of the Buyer (Stuoent) 
hereunder to the Seller (School) or its assignee 
Guarantor ^t^0*"^ 
Sign Here „ « r * ^ Date 
Print Name 
Address 
City" 
•HtJme Tel I 
. Sta te . 
Social Security No , 
. Work Tel ( 
. Z i p . 
iTlQto^TQ/fJUi^Sf ~QLOff£ 
By signing below Buyer (Stuoent; acknowledges a receipt of a 
complete and true copy of this Retail installment Contract and 
agrees toall lhe terms and conditions including tnose se' «ortn on tne 
reverse side _ 
Buyer 
Sign Here 
Print N a m e _ i. 
Address . 1 . ft ~ 
K€1 L*I "£P"" 
L.fc.LK^D H ^ ' 
' ^ y y Date* 
r . i w J A \ ( A f t »' ^ State . -1 
. Z i p . 
Home Tel ( *£>! i V * b " . A 6 7 Work T > I i , _ , 
Social Security No . . 
3ress_L 
Seller^ 
Add  
By rZ . Title. 
City 
Date ^ / ^ / ^ > 
4MARMIMA CO« 
NOTICE: See reverse side for additional te rmspi contract T \% 
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AMERICAN CONCt. T INSURANCE COMPA', SY O D S R S P 
August 6, 1986 
Kelly Howard 
1065 Garnette 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
RE: Our Insured: Robert Buhler 
Our File #: 15362 
Date of Loss: 11/9/85 
Dear Mr* Howard, 
On July 8, 1986 we made a settlement with you for injuries sustained in the above 
captioned incident contingent upon our receiving a copy of the school contract 
for your computer training. 
As of this date, the above mentioned information has not been received. If you 
are still interested in settling your claim, please provide American Concept with 
a copy of your education contract so that we may conclude this matter* 
If you have any questions, please feel'free to contact the undersigned. 
Sincerely, 
Christine L. Kirchoff 
Claims Representative 
CLK:lkm 
Enc. 
f: DEFENDANTS 
I | EXHIBIT 
h ^ 
Centennial Souare • RQ Box 1720 • Raod Gtv. SO S7709 • <60S) 342-1776 
EXHIB'~ 
TabE 
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O P./\A C k A i J ) ' , ~AU(T""8~198&~ 
•Fv^rJ^psjA \o rfriKSw eoYJAr^ i 
^ m ^ i ..ocK/Tfrl. ^kV^ji.nkv/.to.A^. 
>.ft^ AA A^.O (,(rmm&.At>r^ ColLfrgcQL*. 
£LbftJ\SL J3P,/n& TCJl \-Y\M • A ik.Cu' £ 
J^OTAm , ^ n ^ f tOQ. f t f t rm io.V£).Jkh voJU 
e^S ^£JU3L 
C^VA'JLQULM UtCjU.ft 
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K N O W A i l MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That the Undersigned, being of lawful age. for the sole consideration nf E i g h t t h o u s a n d and n o / 1 0 0 
1 1 nnli*rS p f L 0 0 0 . 0 0 
to the undersigned in hand paid, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do/does hereby and for my/our/its heirs, executors, 
administrators, successors and assigns release, acquit and forever discharge R o b e r t B u h l e i and A m e r i c a n Conrpf l t 
Insurance Company 
and his. her, their, or its agents, servants, successors, heirs, executors, administrators and all other persons, firms, corporations, 
associations or partnershios of and from any and all claims, actions, causes of action, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of 
service, expenses and compensation whatsoever, which the undersigned now has/have or which may hereafter accrue on account 
of or in any way growing out of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries and prop-
erty damage and the consequences thereof resulting or to result from the accident, casualty or event which occurred on or 
about the 9th rj*»y nf November t?85 , at or mmr 2100 South and Redwood Road. Salt 
Lake City, Utah 
It is understood and agreed that this settlement is the compromise of a doubtful and disDuted claim, and that the payment 
made is not to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of the party or parties hereby released, and that said releasees 
deny liability therefor and intend merely to avoid litigation and buy their peace. 
The undersigned hereby declare(s) and represent(s) that the injuries sustained are or may be permanent and progressive 
and that recovery therefrom is uncertain and indefinite and in making this Release it is understood ot\6 agreed, that the under-
signed rely(ies) wholly upon the undersigned's judgment, belief end knowledge of the neiurt, exTent, effect and duration of said 
injuries and liability therefor end is made without reliance upon any statement or representation of the party or poti'iez hereby 
released or Ytyelr representatives orjgy any physician or surgeon by them employed. 
The undersigned furtherypeclarejs) and represent(s) that there may be unknown or unanticipated injuries resulting from the above 
stated accident, casualty or event and in making this Release it is understood and agreed that this Release is intended to include such 
injuries. 
The undersigned further declare(s) and represent(s) that no promise, inducement or agreement not herein expressed has been 
made to the undersigned, and that this Release contains the entire agreement between the parties hereto, end that the terms 
of this Release ere contractual and not a mere recital. 
This Release expressly reserves all rights of the person, or persons, on whose behalf the payment is made and the rights of all 
persons in privity or connected with them, end reserves to them their right to pursue their legal remedies, r? any, including but not 
limited to claims for contribution, property damage and personal injury against the undersigned or those in privity or connected with 
the undersigned. 
THE UNDERSIGNED HAS READ THE FOREGOING RELEASE AND FULLY UNDERSTANDS IT. 
Signed, sealed end delivered this. -day of. .. 19-
CAUTION: READ BEFORE SIGNING BELOW f 
• IS 
Witness 
Witness 
- IS 
Witness 
STATE O F . 
SS. EXHiB 1 J 
COUNTY O F . 
On the jay ot. 19. ., before me personally appeered. 
to me known to be the person(s) named herein and who executed the foregoing Release and. 
that voluntarily executed the same. 
My term expires , 19 
-ecknowledaec to me 
Form No. L-3657-A 
Notary Fubiic 
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